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Do Lower Prices For Polluting Goods
Make Environmental Externalities Worse?
Timothy J. Brennan
Abstract
Lower prices for polluting goods will increase their sales and the pollution that results
from their production or use.  Conventional intuition suggests that this relationship implies a
greater need for environmental policy when prices of "dirty" goods fall.  But the economic
inefficiency resulting overproduction of polluting goods may fall, not rise, as the cost of
producing those goods falls.  While lower costs exacerbate overproduction, they also reduce
the difference between private benefit and the total social cost--the sum of private and
external costs--associated with that overproduction.  We derive a test, based on readily
observed or estimated parameters for conditions in which the latter effect outweighs the
former.  In such cases, making a dirty good cheaper to produce may reduce the need for
pollution policy.  This test, with minor modifications, can be applied where the dirty good is
not competitive, demand rather than supply drives the increase in output, and abatement in
production can reduce pollution.  The analysis may speak to whether stricter air pollution
regulations should accompany policies to reduce electricity costs by making power generation
more competitive.
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DO LOWER PRICES FOR POLLUTING GOODS
MAKE ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES WORSE?
Timothy J. Brennan*
Environmental externalities, or any other negative externality, reflect a failure of
prices of the associated good to embody costs imposed on third parties.  When private
negotiations are precluded by transaction costs of one sort or another (Coase, 1960, the
standard remedy for externality problems is to create a cost for the externality that producers
or consumers have to bear.  Two standard theoretical approaches are either to impose a tax on
the externality such as pollution fines (Baumol and Oates, 1988), or to let potential polluters
bid for rights to pollute (Teitenberg, 1980; Portney, 1990 at 74; Peirce and Turner, 1990 at
110-19).1  These approaches are equivalent when the size of the externality and abatement
costs are known (Weitzman, 1974) and enforcement costs are negligible (Downing and
Watson, 1974).  A second-best substitute for these policies--first-best if abatement costs are
prohibitive and pollution-related damages are proportional to output--is a tax on the good
itself (Spulber, 1989 at 366).
An output tax, emissions tax, or requirement to buy a marketable permit all would
address the concern that, in the absence of a market reflecting pollution costs, there will be
too much of the "dirty" good produced.  These familiar concerns with overproduction may
engender a belief that the bigger the polluting industry, the bigger the pollution problem.  In
particular, if the cost of producing a "dirty" good falls, so will its market price, increasing the
quantity produced and sold.  This increases the level of associated pollution, hence increases
the need for policy to do something about it.  Such a belief may affect debates over policy.
For example, if current efforts to deregulate electricity lead to lower generation costs and
power prices, a belief that output and the need for environmental policy are correlated will
add weight to a position that deregulation must be accompanied with commitments to stronger
environmental protection.2
                                               
* Senior Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future, and Professor, Policy Sciences
and Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore County.  Thanks go to Karen Palmer and Molly Macauley for
helpful comments.  The author bears sole responsibility for errors.
1 Giving away permits, as with EPA's recent sulfur dioxide emissions trading programs, may be an inferior
solution.  Using the revenues raised by pollution fees or permit auctions to cut existing taxes may be necessary
for these policies to increase net welfare when distortions from those taxes would warrant subsidizing
complements, including pollution-causing goods.  See Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997).
2 Deregulation may make environmental regulations more effective.  For example, a regulated, franchised utility
may treat a pollution tax as something merely to be passed on to ratepayers, while a deregulated power provider
would have an incentive to cut pollution in order to reduce tax payments.  For an extensive discussion of the ways
regulation could limit the effectiveness of incentive-based environmental policies, see Bohi and Burtraw (1992).Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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But the premise of a correlation that output and the need for environmental policy
need not be sound.  Reducing the private, nonexternal cost of supplying a commodity, or
increasing demand for it, will typically increase output and the size of the environmental
damage created by its production.  However, the inefficiency attributable to overproduction--
the basis for an efficiency argument in support of intervention--need not increase.  To
oversimplify only a bit, the economic loss from uninternalized pollution is essentially the
difference between the total social cost of supplying the good--private production cost plus
environmental damage--and the value consumers place on getting the good produced, but
evaluated over only the amount of the overproduction that occurs because the market does not
reflect this damage.  By increasing output, a fall in production costs or an increase in demand
generally will reduce efficiency, because more overproduction makes environmental matters
worse.3  But reductions in cost or increases in demand also reduce the difference between
social cost and consumer value, reducing the size of the inefficiency.
In other words, this "difference reduction" effect creates a counterintuitive possibility
that dirty good output and environmental policy are substitutes rather than complements.  A
numerical example of the effect may be useful.  Suppose that electricity is the dirty good in
question, and that the value of a particular kilowatt-hour (kWh) to its user is 10¢, and that the
private production cost of the kWh is 8¢.  Absent environmental externalities, this generates
2¢ in consumer surplus.  Suppose, however, that this kWh generates 5¢ in environmental cost.
Social costs are now 13¢, and the economic loss from its production is 3¢.
Suppose that opening the electricity market to competition reduces the private
production costs of this kWh from 8¢ to 6¢.  The social cost of producing this kWh falls from
13¢ to 11¢.  It still is part of the overproduction of electricity, since consumer benefits are less
than production cost, but the size of the loss falls from 3¢ to 1¢ (11¢ - 10¢).  It is this 2¢
reduction in the size of the loss associated with overproduction of dirty goods that leads to the
possibility that falling prices could reduce the net economic loss associated with pollution,
despite the increased output that exacerbates that inefficiency.
If this "difference reduction" effect outweighs the "output overproduction" effect, the
need for policy to address the environmental problem may also fall, perhaps dramatically.  As
an extreme but not unrealistic example, assume that the costs of addressing an environmental
policy problem include fixed administrative and legal costs associated with devising and
imposing remedies.  If price reductions or increases in demand for a dirty good reduce the
inefficiency from environmental damages associated with its production, these fixed costs
may no longer be worth incurring.  Policy changes such as restructuring the electricity
industry could take some environmental concerns off the policy agenda that were present and
justifiable before.
                                               
3 The "reswitching" controversies of the 1950s serve as a reminder that growth in output theoretically could
create a scale effect justifying an industry switch to a new technology that happens to pollute less.  For purposes
of the analysis here, we assume the "normal" case in which the level of environmental damage associated with
the good in question is a monotone increasing function of the level of output of that good.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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Of course, the reverse effect on efficiency may hold.  If the "output overproduction"
effect outweighs the "difference reduction" effect, cost reductions could warrant
environmental policies to address concerns that were, and should have been, previously
neglected.  However, that intuitive result is only a possibility, not a certainty.
It is important to note two different aspects of the environmental policy problem
associated with cost reductions or demand growth not at issue here.  First, we are not
questioning whether cost reductions as a whole are a good thing in polluting industries.  Such
a comparison would involve comparing the increase in the marginal external cost from the
increased output to the total cost reduction, rather than only to the reduction in the cost of
supplying the excess output.  This tradeoff, too, may be ambiguous, but in that case both
aspects of the ambiguity seem fairly obvious.4
Second, we recognize an increase in the output of a polluting good normally increases
total environmental damages.  This increase in damages may warrant public support for
research and development programs into abatement technologies, to change the relevant
private and social costs of electricity production.  In this respect environmental costs are not
entirely unique.  Taking electricity as an example, suppose that the costs of generation were to
fall because new power plants were able to get more power from the same amount of fuel, but
that the amount of labor per kilowatt-hour produced remained fixed.  As a result of the cost
reduction, there might be a stronger case for publicly funded research and development into
labor-saving electricity generation technologies.5  Aside from the overproduction
inefficiency, the argument that increased output warrants in increase in damage-reduction
research would be similar.  But these arguments apply to any cost of production, not only to
those that might be externally rather than internally borne.6  Hence, R&D arguments do not
warrant policies to deal with environmental externalities, and it is the case for externality
control policy that is the subject under discussion here.
We begin that discussion with a diagrammatic exposition of the different effects
arising from cost reductions to illustrate the tradeoffs affecting the need for environmental
output control policies.  This illustration reflects an assumption that pollution can be abated
only by reducing output rather than by switching technologies; this assumption is lifted later.
We can use this analysis to derive a relationship between supply and demand elasticities,
external costs, and overproduction that indicates when cost reductions increase the size of the
externality-related inefficiency.  This relationship has some ready interpretations when output
                                               
4 In the interest of completeness, an appendix analyzes the net welfare effects of a change in costs, using
notation developed in the text below.  See Freeman and Harrington (1990) for similar measurement of the gross
effects of changes in production technology.
5 I ignore labor market failures, political forces, or social considerations that might make using more labor a
benefit of the economic process rather than a cost.
6 Clearly, if generation companies do not bear environmentally related costs, they generally will not have the
incentive to undertake research and development to mitigate them.  They may have an incentive to undertake
such research directly or give grants to universities or research laboratories to do it if doing so generates
"goodwill" that they can capitalize on in the marketplace.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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markets are competitive, and it generally applies unless the dirty good market is insufficiently
competitive to ensure that the output level is greater than it would be if it were competitive
and producers took external costs into account in their supply decisions.  We derive and apply
a general test for when cost reductions increase or decrease the need for policy to analyze
noncompetitive markets.  Specifically, we analyze settings where the equilibrium price is a
constant markup over cost (as in Cournot models with constant demand elasticity) and for
Cournot oligopolies with linear demand and constant marginal cost.
With those derivations in hand, we display examples of cost reductions that reduce the
net welfare loss from uninternalized externalities.  The factor leading to beneficial outcomes
in these examples that supply or demand is inelastic (perfectly, in the examples) at the market
equilibrium (assuming no internalizing of these externalities).  Inelastic demand or supply is
not a necessary condition; we invoke it only to make obvious the possibility that cost
reductions and environmental policy are substitutes.  It is not difficult to show that
qualitatively similar results for cost reductions follow when demand for the output increases.
The analysis concludes with a lifting of the restriction that abatement of pollution within the
production process is not possible.  This turns out to be a qualitatively unimportant restriction,
in that we can readily incorporate net abatement benefits into the criteria for correlating the
case for policy intervention with reductions in costs overall.
The models illustrated here should provide a counterweight to the intuition connecting
lower prices of dirty goods to a greater need for environmental policy.  Our analysis indicates
how formal or informal empirical estimates of costs and elasticities would indicate whether
externality-related inefficiencies increase or decrease following a change in policy regarding
dirty goods markets, such as restructuring of the electricity industry.  Policy makers could use
it to improve the judgments they have to make as to whether changing economic conditions
warrant more or less attention to environmental externalities.
DIAGRAMMING THE TRADE-OFF
Modeling the effect of cost reductions on the need for environmental policy is easiest
when the output market is competitive.  Once that is done, it is not hard to generalize to
situations when the output market is less than fully competitive.
Using a conventional partial equilibrium setting, let q be output and p(q) be the
demand curve; p' < 0.  Private marginal costs of production are c(q, z), where z is a parameter
of interest, e.g., the price of one of the production inputs.  Let z* be the initial value of z.  We
assume that cq ‡ 0 and cz > 0, where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.  Marginal external
costs associated with the production of q are measured by e(q), assumed positive for all q.
The normal assumption is that e' ‡ 0, but that assumption is not crucial to the analysis.
Finally, let qm be the quantity of output sold in the market and qo be the optimal quantity of q.
Figure 1 displays the familiar graph of the welfare costs of an externality.  The
competitive market output, qm, is the level where willingness to pay, p(q) just equals private
marginal cost, c(q, z*).  The social optimum qo is where willingness to pay just equals
marginal social cost, which is the sum of those private costs and marginal external costs e(q).Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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For all levels of production between qo and qm, the willingness of consumers to pay for the
good is less than the social marginal cost of producing the good.  The shaded area indicates
the social welfare losses from the externality, equal to the difference between social marginal
cost and willingness to pay.
p(q)
c(q, z*)
c(q, z*) + e(q)
$
q qo qm
Figure 1: Welfare losses from externalities in a competitive market
Now, consider a reduction Dz of z.  This will shift both private and social marginal
costs downward by czDz, affecting qo, qm, and the size of the welfare loss.  Let qo(Dz) and
qm(Dz) be the new optimal and market output, and define qo(0) and qm(0) as the original
optimal and market outputs.  To see the effects of reducing z by Dz, we superimpose the new
private and social cost curves on Figure 1 to generate Figure 2.  The darker area reflects the
expected increase in the externality-induced welfare loss, arising because the fall in costs
results in a fall in prices and an increase in output.  Defining Dqm = qm(Dz) – qm(0), the
approximate size of this added welfare loss is e(qm)Dqm--the marginal external loss times the
increase in output.
However, there is a countervailing benefit, indicated by the lighter area.  This change
reflects the fact that as costs fall, the difference between marginal social cost and willingness
to pay--that is, the marginal inefficiency from overproduction--falls.  If we let Dc be the
absolute value of the average fall in cost over the range of inefficient overproduction between
qo(0) and qm(0), the fall in z contributes to a reduction in the externality-related welfare loss,







z) + e(q) D
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Figure 2: The change in welfare loss from a decrease in z
The net effect on welfare loss from the reduction in costs, notated by DWL, is therefore
DWL » e(qm)Dqm – Dc[qm – qo].
Accordingly, the welfare loss, and thus the need for environmental policy, increases with a










We derive more explicit conditions below.  However, equation (1) suffices to indicate that if
demand or supply is sufficiently inelastic to keep market output from changing much if costs
fall, i.e., if Dqm is sufficiently small, the welfare loss from inefficient overproduction of the
dirty good will fall as its production costs fall.  In that case, the need for environmental policy
would fall, not rise, with a reduction in the cost of producing the polluting good.
It is not difficult to generalize this to the noncompetitive case.  Equation 1 continues to
describe the condition for when cost reductions increase welfare loss, although in practice the
relationship between Dqm and cost reductions will be more complex in the absence of
competition.  In the absence of competition, two cases can arise, depending on whether qm,
the market output, is greater than or less than qo, the social optimum.  In the absence of
competition, the latter becomes a possibility.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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•  If qm > qo, as under competition, there remains a welfare loss due to overproduction,
although the welfare loss is smaller than it would have been had there been competition
setting market price equal to private marginal cost.  The only qualitative difference between
this case and the case displayed in Figure 2 is that qm is not simply determined by the
intersection of the private marginal cost and demand curves.  However, it is still a function of
the overall demand curve p(q) and the cost parameter z.  Since reductions in cost lead to
reductions in price even in the absence of competition, Dqm will still rise as costs fall.
•  If qm < qo, the loss from underproduction due to the lack of competition7
overwhelms the overproduction because producers and consumers do not bear the external
cost.  If so, policies to internalize the externality will reduce qm, exacerbating the welfare loss
associated with market power.8
MORE FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS
A more formal derivation of the conditions under which falling costs increases the
inefficiency associated with externalities allows more specificity in ascertaining when
environmental policy is more or less warranted by cost reductions.  It is helpful to represent
the effects of the cost parameter z on market and optimal output as qm(z) and qo(z)
respectively.  Externality-related welfare losses WL (z), where qm(z) > qo(z), are given by
WL(z) =  ı ￿
qo(z)
qm(z)
  [c(x, z) + e(x) – p(x)]dx .
The effect of a change in z is
                                               
7 Regulation that sets price above marginal cost may also lead observed prices in the market to be less than the
optimum, even taking environmental externalities into account.
   More generally, a reason that costs may fall could be because of a move from inefficient cost-of-service
regulation to a setting in which firms have an incentive to cut costs.  If such cost savings are present, such a
policy change can have significant welfare benefits, even if the underlying monopoly problem persists (Brennan,
1996).  Estimating the net effects of a change from regulation to competition, where increased output under the
latter could increase pollution, should include those benefits as well as any net effects on welfare as outlined by
Equation (1).
8 One can use diagrams similar to Figure 2 to examine whether a fall in costs, in the presence of an externality,
exacerbates or mitigates the welfare loss associated with market power.  As in the case described in the text,
there are two effects, but with reversed implications.  The Dqm from the fall in costs now leads to a benefit, as
we are producing p(qm) in marginal benefits that, because qm < qo, must be greater than c(qm, z) + e(qm).
However, the reduction in cost Dc[qo–qm] also has a reversed effect, increasing the welfare loss by increasing
the difference between willingness to pay and marginal social cost, including the external costs.  Equation (1)
thus becomes the condition for when a change in costs reduces the need for antimonopoly policy, rather than
indicating when there is an increase in the need for environmental policy.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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WL'(z) = ı ￿
qo(z)
qm(z)
  cz(x, z)dx   +  qm'[c(qm, z) + e(qm) – p(qm)] –
qo'[c(qo, z) + e(qo) – p(qo)]. (2)
Let the function h(q), treating z as a parameter, be the marginal harm generated by
additional output, i.e., the marginal difference between social cost and willingness to pay at the
market output:
h(q) = c(q, z) + e(q) – p(q).
By inspection, h' > 0.  By definition of qo as the social optimum, h(qo) = 0.  Suppressing some
notation, this allows us to eliminate the third term in equation (2) and rewrite it as
WL'(z) = ı ￿
qo
qm
 cz(x, z)dx   +  qm'h(qm). (3)
The first term is the reduction in cost over the range of overproduction, positive since cz > 0.
The second term is the product of the change in market output resulting from a change in the
cost parameter (qm', typically negative) times h(qm), positive since qm > qo.  Welfare losses
fall with a reduction in z if and only if the cost savings represented by the first term exceed the
increase in the externality costs represented by the second term.
The key results follow from analyzing qm'.  The derivative of qm with respect to z can
be represented as a succession of partial derivatives:
qm' =  
dqm













where all of the derivatives are evaluated at qm.  Consequently, we can rewrite qm' as
qm' =  –edep/c 
qm
c(qm, z)
  cz(qm, z),
where









is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for q at qm, andTimothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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is the observed elasticity of market price with regard to changes in cost.9
If cz(q, z) = cz(qm, z) for all q between qo and qm, i.e., the reduction in marginal cost is
constant over the range of overproduction, the integral in equation (3) becomes cz[qm – qo].
Consequently, increases in private cost increase externality-related inefficiency, and decreases
in cost reduce it, if and only if
qm – qo
qm
    >  edep/c 
h(qm)
c(qm, z)
  . (4)
This equation can be simplified further if marginal cost is constant and price is a constant
multiple k of it, i.e., p = kc(z).  When this holds, ep/c = 1, eliminating a term from equation (4),
making the condition the simpler
qm – qo
qm
    >  ed 
h(qm)
c(qm, z)
  . (5)
This gives us our basic policy rule: For an increase (decrease) in costs to increase
(decrease) externality-induced inefficiency, the percentage of output that is overproduced has
to exceed the ratio of the marginal external cost to the marginal private cost, times the elasticity
of demand, measured at the market output.  This relationship holds in two simple cases:
•  the standard case of competitive, constant cost markets, when price equals marginal
cost.
•  in constant cost monopolies or symmetric Cournot oligopolies, with constant demand
elasticity, where price is given by
p =  
ned
ned – 1  c,
when n is the number of firms in the oligopoly and ed > 1/n.
Two somewhat more complex cases are also of interest:
•  In the linear demand (p(q) = a – bq) symmetric Cournot case with constant marginal
cost, and where all firms costs depend identically on z, it is not difficult to show that
                                               
9 This is not just the elasticity of a competitive supply curve, but will depend on that as well as on the degree of
competition and the elasticity of demand.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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edep/c  =  
c(z)
a – c(z) ,
where c(z) is defined as c(q, z) when marginal cost c is constant for all q.  This substitution
allows us to rewrite condition (4) as
qm – qo
qm
    >  
h(qm)
a – c(z)  .
This condition is noteworthy because, except for its effect on h(qm), the slope of the demand
curve b does not matter.  The slope affects both qm and qo in the same proportions, leaving the
left-hand side independent of b.  The direction of a change in the value of policy depends only
on the difference between maximum reservation price and marginal cost.
•  The general competitive case when marginal cost is not constant over all levels of
output.  It is easier to begin directly by computing qm'.  To do this, implicitly differentiate the
market equilibrium condition




cq – p'  .
Redefining the absolute value of demand elasticity ed as –p/p'q, and using the equality of




allows us to find that







Because c(qm, z) = p(qm) under competition, h(qm) = e(qm).  If, as before, cz(q, z) =










  . (6)
This implies equation (4) as a special case, since under perfect competition




In addition, if supply elasticity es is infinite--the constant cost case--equation (6) reduces to
equation (5).  Note also that the last fraction on the left in equation (6) is the ratio of marginal
external cost to market price.
CASES WHEN REDUCING THE COSTS OF "DIRTY" GOODS REDUCES THE
NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Equation (3), the condition for when reducing production costs reduces the size of the
externality, tells us that environmental regulation will be less necessary if the effect on market
output of a reduction in costs, qm', is sufficiently small.  Following equation (6), we can make
use of this to construct a couple of simple situations in competitive markets, based on inelastic
demand or supply, to exemplify the possibility that regulation becomes less necessary with
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Figure 3: Welfare gain from a reduction in private costs,
when demand is inelastic at the market price.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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Demand is displayed using a heavier line, to indicate more clearly that it is inelastic at
the market output qm.  The shaded area indicates the welfare gain caused by the reduction in
private costs from c(z*) to c(z*–Dz).  But because demand is inelastic, market output does not
change, i.e., qm(0) = qm(Dz) (following the above notation).  The reduction in price does not
lead to more output to exacerbate the externality.  The reduction in costs reduces the size of
the inefficiency from overproduction, reducing the need for policy intervention.
















Figure 4: Welfare gain from a reduction in private costs,
when supply is inelastic at the market price.
The heavier line indicates that marginal private cost, hence marginal social costs,
becomes infinite past the market output.  A reduction in costs brought about by a fall in z has
no effect on qm.  That reduction brings about the same reduction in the welfare loss
attributable to the externality as in Figure 3, with no output increase that might counteract it.
Inelastic supply leads to the same conclusion as inelastic demand--reducing private costs
reduces rather than exacerbates the need for environmental policy.
SIMILAR EFFECTS FROM CHANGES IN DEMAND
Identical results follow if the exogenous change is an increase in demand rather than a
reduction in costs.  Showing this requires only a slight modification of the above model.
Eliminate the z parameter, leaving marginal cost c(q) depending only upon output.  Let y be a
parameter affecting demand, which is now p(q, y), where pq £ 0 and py ‡ 0.  The optimal and
market output will now depend on y instead of z, as all else is held equal.  Consequently, the
welfare loss function becomesTimothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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WL(y) =  ı ￿
qo(y)
qm(y)
  [c(x) + e(x) – p(x, y)]dx  .
The effect of a change in y on welfare is
WL'(y) = ı ￿
qo(y)
qm(y)
  –py(x, y)dx   +  qm'[c(qm) + e(qm) – p(qm, y)] –
qo'[c(qo) + e(qo) – p(qo, y)].
As before, representing the marginal net harm by the function h, modified in this context to be
h(q) = c(q) + e(q) – p(q, y);
and because h(qo) = 0, we obtain
WL'(y) = ı ￿
qo
qm
 –py(x, y)dx   +  qm'h(qm). (3*)
where qm' is now the derivative with respect to the demand parameter y rather than the cost
parameter z.  The asterisk indicates similarity to the equations in the derivation of the effect of
changes in private cost on welfare losses.
Unlike the cost case, the integral is negative.  Increasing y acts to reduce the welfare
loss, because increasing demand for the "dirty" good decreases the difference between total
social cost and willingness to pay.  This is the "difference effect" discussed above for changes
in costs.  In competitive markets, in monopoly markets where the demand effect py is constant
over q, and in other circumstances we would regard as "normal," increasing y by Dy will
typically increase qm.10  Figure 5 illustrates these effects.  The lightly shaded area indicates
the reduction in welfare loss from the increase in willingness to pay for the dirty good, and the
darkly shaded area indicates the increase in externality-related inefficiency loss from the
increase in output.
                                               
10 If the sellers of the dirty good have market power, it is possible that shifting out the demand curve could
result in a reduction in market output, depending on the magnitude of the shift inframarginally relative to the
shift at the margin.  For example, if the seller is a monopolist, qm can fall with an increase in y if pqy is












Figure 5: Welfare loss effects from a shift in the demand curve
Effects of increases in demand will be similar to those from decreases in cost.  The
analysis of qm' is more difficult to generalize than in the cost case.  Since y affects p directly,
we cannot decompose qm' to derive general elasticity-based relationships as in the cost case.
However, if the dirty good market is competitive, it is not hard to derive similar relationships,
in the case where py is constant between qo and qm.  When demand rather than supply is
parameterized, the competitive market equilibrium condition is
p(qm, y) = c(qm).
As before, implicit differentiation yields
qm' = 
py
 c' – pq
  .
If py is constant between qo and qm, the integral in equation (3*) becomes –py[qm – qo].
Substituting the above expression for qm' into equation (3*) and dividing both terms by py
shows that the welfare loss falls as demand increases if and only if




As in the cost case, transforming the denominator on the left hand side into elasticity terms,
and recognizing that under competition h(qm) = e(qm), allows us to rewrite this condition for










  . (6*)
Because p(qm, y) equals market price in the demand case, and because c(qm, z) equals market
price in the cost case, this expression is identical to equation (6), the condition for when a
uniform decrease in costs (rather than demand) reduces the welfare loss associated with
externalities.
INCORPORATING ABATEMENT IN PRODUCTION
The models so far have treated pollution as an ineradicable byproduct of production.
But the absence of environmental policy can create a second inefficiency.  In addition to
excess output of the dirty good, the social costs of producing that good will be too high if
producers do not face an appropriate incentive to substitute away from relatively pollution-
intensive inputs.  Taking electricity as an example, the first inefficiency, and that exclusively
discussed so far, would be that people consume too much power if the price does not reflect
the marginal environmental damages associated with its production.  The second inefficiency
is without having to cover the cost of these damages, electricity generators as a whole will use
too much "dirty" coal to produce electricity and not enough cleaner fuels, such as natural gas.
Full modeling of the interaction between changes in the private cost of producing a
commodity and efficient abatement of external social cost is beyond the scope of this paper.
But simple estimates, based on the assumption that actual change in the private cost would
have little significant effect on optimal substitution away from pollution-intensive inputs or
technologies, do allow us to incorporate into our measures the inefficiencies from having no
incentive to abate.11  Those simple estimates allow us to use the tests already derived with
only a slight revised interpretation of the emissions damages measure.
As with the no-abatement case, a diagram illustrates the relative effects.  Figure 1
above reflected the assumption that the social marginal cost curve was itself independent of
policy choice.  However, the absence of policy that leads to too little incentive to abate in the
production process implies that the social costs incurred are too high at every level of output.
We can show this by amending Figure 1 to include losses from excessive costs, as well as
excessive output, as follows:
The lightly shaded area reflects the addition of a(q), the extra social cost of producing
q associated with the lack of efficient abatement in the production process.  The optimal level
of output, qo, remains at the intersection of the (original) social marginal cost curve and the
demand curve, since the former reflects the minimum social cost of producing q, taking
efficient abatement into account.
                                               
11 The results of precise estimates are probably an order of magnitude beneath the noise level of quantitative
cost data (or informal estimates) available to those who decide when changes in environmental policy are








c(q, z*) + e(q) + a(q)
Figure 6: Welfare losses from externalities in a competitive market with
too little abatement
The effect of a change in the private cost of producing q from a change Dz from the
original value z* of the cost parameter would now be measured by a change in both shaded
areas.  The analysis above covered changes in the darkly shaded area alone.  Diagrammatically,
and using the earlier notation, the lightly shaded area just expands out from qm to qm(Dz).
Mathematically, the added cost is just a(qm(Dz)) –  a(qm(0)).12  Assume that a change in z
would have little significant effect on the per-unit inefficiency associated with suboptimal
abatement, and designate a' as the constant marginal inefficiency from too little abatement.
The added cost is then a'Dqm, i.e., the marginal inefficiency times the change in output in the
absence of environmental policy to take external costs into account.
Incorporating the costs of abatement into the analysis of the need for policy becomes a
matter of adding a' to the external marginal cost function e(.) and marginal net welfare
function h(.) in the formal representations.  An even simpler way is to recast e(.) and h(.), not
in terms of the counterfactual external cost with efficient abatement in the production process.
Rather, we only have to interpret and estimate these based on the actual external cost,
combining both the external cost with efficient abatement and the added cost when producers
lack the incentive to abate.  Recognizing inefficient abatement than makes e(.) and h(.) larger,
and in that sense will tend to tilt balance more in favor of intervention when costs fall.
However, the possibility that the need for intervention will fall, e.g., with highly inelastic
demand for the commodity in question remains, with a qualitatively if not quantitatively
identical test.  Even recognizing that policy could lead to more efficient abatement, we should
                                               
12 In more complex settings where changes in the private cost change the per-unit inefficiency due from too
little abatement, a(.) would itself become a function of z as well as q.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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still be cautious in inferring a change in the incremental need for policy when private costs
fall or demand increases.
CONCLUSION
The common intuition is that private cost reductions (or increases in demand) for dirty
goods and environmental policies are complements.  According to this view, as the supply of
the former increases, the demand for environmental latter goes up.  We have shown here that
cost reductions and environmental policy may be substitutes, not complements.  Making a
dirty good cheaper to produce, or increasing demand for it, may reduce the externality-related
inefficiency underlying the economic case for corrective environmental policy.  We have
illustrated the tradeoffs, derived conditions when cost reductions or demand increases reduce
the welfare loss, and displayed cases where the externality-related inefficiency clearly shrinks.
While constructed assuming no substitution possibilities in the production process itself, the
analyses readily accommodate the possibility of abatement.
We also hope to go beyond theoretical claims and provide practical policy guidance.
In principle, if the size of the marginal externality, the amount of overproduction, market
price, and demand and supply elasticities are known, the direction in the change of the
inefficiency following marginal changes in costs or demand can be predicted, for a fairly wide
variety of cases.  Ideally, empirical assessments based on these parameters should accompany
any policy change likely to increase demand or reduce production costs for dirty goods, e.g.,
expanding competition in markets for electric power.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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APPENDIX
Decreases in cost or increases in demand for dirty goods may reduce welfare overall
economic welfare because of externality-related inefficiencies.  Using notation from the
paper, if cost is affected by an exogenous parameter z, total welfare W is
W =  ı ￿
0
qm(z)
[p(x) – c(x, z) – e(x)]dx .
Recalling that h(q) = c(q, z) + e(q) – p(q), differentiating with respect to z gives
W' = – ı ￿
0
qm(z)
cz(x, z)dx   – h(qm)qm'.
For reductions in cost to increase welfare, W' < 0.  Let cz(avg) be the average reduction






  cz(x, z)dx .
The condition for a reduction in z to increase welfare becomes
–cz(avg)qm < h(qm)qm'.
Dividing through by –c(qm, z)qm gives
cz(avg)




qm   . (A1)
The term on the left-hand side of equation (A1) is essentially the percentage reduction
in cost from a decrease in z.  The first term on the right hand side is the ratio of the marginal
inefficiency at market output to marginal production cost.  Note again that in the competitive
case, h(qm) = e(qm), which would make the first fraction in the right hand side of equation
(A1) equal to the ratio of marginal external cost to marginal private cost.  The third fraction is
essentially the percentage increase in output from a fall in z.Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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For a cost reduction to increase welfare when externalities are present, the average
percentage reduction in costs must be greater than the ratio of external to private cost times
the percentage change in output brought about by that cost reduction.  If this does not hold,
e.g., if demand and supply are sufficiently elastic to make –qm'/qm sufficiently large, a
reduction in cost could reduce overall welfare.  The analysis for the welfare consequences of
changes in demand is similar, with a percentage change in willingness to pay replacing the
percentage reduction in costs on the left-hand side of equation (A1).Timothy J. Brennan  RFF 99-40
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